Religious Leaders barred from Israel

Five U.S. Jewish, Christian and Muslim leaders were barred from going to Israel under a new law that prohibits entry to the Jewish state by foreign activists who advocate a boycott of the country.

One of them was the deputy director of  “Jewish Voice for Peace”, Rabbi Alissa Wise. I wrote to her as follows:

Dear Rabbi Wise,

I read with interest that you have been refused permission to fly to Israel

Not knowing anything about your organization, I went to your website, which carries the headline: “The people of Gaza should have electricity, clean drinking water, functioning hospitals, and opportunities to rebuild. This means that Israel needs to end its brutal blockade, and the world needs to pressure them to do just that.”

As a person who always votes for Meretz in our national elections, I am sympathetic of a left-wing agenda for the State of Israel. That having been said, the above headline makes no reference whatsoever to the part that Hamas has played in bringing about the current situation. You may recall that when Israel unilaterally vacated Gush Katif, it left the greenhouses and irrigation systems intact as a gesture of goodwill. This did not stop Hamas from arming itself and firing rockets on Sederot’s civilian population. Where were you then? Did you condemn their actions? As you know, Hamas’s stated policy is to work for the destruction of Israel. It says as much in its Charter.

Dr. Mahmoud Al Zahar, a co-founder of Hamas, is on record as having stated: “Neither the liberation of the Gaza Strip nor the liberation of the West Bank or even Jerusalem will suffice us. Hamas will pursue the armed struggle until the liberation of all our lands. We don’t recognize the state of Israel or its right to hold onto one inch of Palestine. Palestine is an Islamic land belonging to all the Muslims.”

And you want us to end the blockade! That is not what you do with an enemy. (Look at what your own country does to Cuba, which is not committed to the destruction of the United States of America.)

Of course I sympathize with the suffering of Gaza’s civilian population, but they chose their leaders and pay the price for that in the same way as ordinary Germans suffered after Adolf Hitler had been elected by them as their chancellor.

As you will gather, I do not share your political sympathies. I feel sure that you have no wish to see Israel destroyed, but an open border with Gaza would risk precisely that. I can see why my government decided to keep you out.

Yours sincerely,

Rabbi Michael Boyden

Posted in Boycott, Boycott of Israel, Pressuring Israel | 2 Comments

A Current Reasonable Resolution to the Conflict 2017

Recent regional political changes have seemingly lessened or even removed pressure from Israel to pursue a “two-state” solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in the near future. While it may be true that there is now less pressure on Israel to make major concessions in regard to that conflict, the primary impetus for the entire process remains in place.

By the early 1990s, most Israelis realized that some form of separation between the Israeli and Palestinian populations was essential for the future well-being of Israel. Furthermore, it was understood that the most reasonable way to accomplish that goal was to promote the creation of some sort of Palestinian state. This has not changed. A significant majority of Israelis continue to hold this general view, but some specifics have changed

Most Israelis now believe that more stringent security measures must be put in place today than would have been considered essential in the year 2000, 2007, or even 2010. Events in Gaza since the year 2000 and events in Egypt, Syria, Iraq, and Iran since 2009 dramatically change the security requirements that both Jordan and Israel will require on the Jordanian border and for ongoing security requirements within the West Bank.

Most people now believe that Gaza and the West Bank will likely remain separate political entities to a significant extent going forward. The leadership of Gaza, Hamas, has been in a heated military conflict with Egypt that in recent months has lessened somewhat but remains tense. Hamas would have to be removed from power before Egypt’s anti-Muslim Brotherhood government substantially improves relations with Gaza. The current answer to that problem is neither invasion, nor imposition of rule by the Palestinian Authority lead by Mahmoud Abbas. It is instead, the installation of Mohammed Dahlan.

Mohammed Dahlan is a nationalist political rival of President Abbas. Dahlan has a long history in Gaza, having been born in Khan Younis and having been the leader of Fatah in Gaza. Since 2001, when he called for reforms in the Palestinian Authority, he has been on the outs with Fatah’s West Bank based leadership. Israel, Egypt, and the UAE all see him as a good alternative to Hamas in Gaza, while Hamas itself may see him as better than the Palestinian Authority. Time will tell if a compromise that brings Dahlan into some sort of significant position of power in Gaza will be effective in bringing about positive change for the people of Gaza, for Israel, and for Egypt.

In the meantime, claims of authority over Gaza by the Palestinian Authority are not based in the PA’s ability to govern there, but instead out of the belief that the West Bank and Gaza are remnants of a larger entity, Palestine, that should remain connected. This narrative has necessitated solutions to the conflict for the Palestinians that do not prioritize the needs of the people of the West Bank as opposed to Gaza and at the same time result in harsh policies by the Palestinian Authority against the population of Gaza, such as shutting off their electricity or denying medical care.

In regard to an achievable solution on the whole, however, what I originally proposed in 2014 largely remains what I would propose today. Some things that I suggested at that point in time might be necessary, now are unquestionably so.

The reality continues to be that what is possible for Israel to concede in regard to resolutions of the conflict is not enough for the Palestinian side to prioritize reaching an agreement over and above continuing to fight; and what is demanded by the Palestinian side is seen as more harmful by Israeli leaders than continuing to face violence and anti-Israel activism.

Israel’s improved relations with the Sunni Nationalist powers and the BRIC nations, Brazil, Russia, India, and China (I left out South Africa on purpose), have resulted both in an improved likelihood in achieving a good solution for Israel and in a reduced need to try to do so.

This all said, the idea that there is an obvious solution to the conflict with generally agreed upon parameters that could be easily achieved misrepresents the reality. Here are five major issues:

  1. There is no solution that addresses the realities of Jerusalem that can please both sides and many possible solutions would result in nightmare scenarios for the future.
  2. While the “Right of Return” of Palestinian refugees to homes in Israel is almost certainly not a viable possibility, no alternative is likely to be politically, much less religiously, acceptable to Palestinians.
  3. There may have been discussions about “territorial swaps based on the 1967 lines,” but there are numerous problems that are obfuscated by that simple summation.
  4. Movement of people between Gaza and the West Bank may be necessary for Palestinian unity, but it is a security nightmare for both Israel and the Palestinian Authority, and more recently for Egypt and Jordan.
  5. Finally, Israeli control over the Jordanian border seems to be mandatory for the foreseeable future in order to meet the security concerns for Israel, Jordan, and a future Palestinian state in any form.

Let’s start by looking at the last of the five. International forces have all failed miserably to halt sectarian violence. Suggestions that any international force could step in and prevent Islamic militants from moving into the West Bank and causing problems for both the Palestinian Authority and Israel are laughable. International forces in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, the Sinai, Sudan and other places in the region have proven incompetent in maintaining security, preventing rearming of militant groups, or even in preventing major wars and genocides. This means that any agreement will necessarily have Israeli troops on the Jordanian border for a long time into the future and it will be unreasonable to set any final date by which that would be forced to end.

Movement between the northern and southern West Bank could be easily ensured, even if direct access between Jerusalem and the Dead Sea was maintained. However, with the level of militancy in Gaza at present, traffic between the two Palestinian territories will need to be closely monitored. There is no way that people could simply be allowed to travel through Israeli territory on their way to and from Gaza at this point. Remember that Egypt currently has sealed off its own border with Gaza because of threats coming from Gaza and that Israel has fought multiple wars with militant groups based in Gaza. There are ways to substantially increase economic cooperation between the territories, but because of the weaponry available in Gaza, all shipments to Gaza will need to be closely monitored for years going forward from a peace agreement.

Palestinians themselves may be concerned about Hamas supporters living in the southern West Bank bringing their militancy to the north, but that would likely be an internal Palestinian issue rather than something to negotiate.

It is also the case that Israeli control over the Jordanian border enables less stringent controls on the Israeli-West Bank border. Without Jordanian border control, more stringent security would need to be put in place on the internal border in light of terrorist threats, and that would severely harm economic interaction between the two nations and do grave harm to tourism within Palestinian areas, as it does now when border security is increased.

The basis of the idea of “territorial swaps” is that the Palestinians need enough territory and the proper kind of territory to form a viable state. It is not that the Palestinians are entitled to all of what was Jordanian occupied territory 1948-1967. The latter concept is an impediment to negotiations, for among other reasons, because it violates the most basic concept of the negotiations, that Israel must have secure borders after a peace agreement. Without them, future violence is ensured and any agreement that the two sides reach will not be worth the paper on which it is written. The 1967 lines were far from secure.

The Separation Barrier, with some possible exceptions, runs along the path that provides the necessary security against terrorism that Israel requires. Thus it is the current route of the Separation Barrier, not the 1967 lines, that is the most viable basis for negotiations. There are opportunities for that path to be altered during negotiations and some Israeli settlements may end up on the Palestinian side following such negotiations. It is certainly the case that new settlements and outposts constructed on the Palestinian side of the barrier create new impediments to making any solution work for the Israelis, because it increases the cost of what would have to be yielded in a final status agreement.

The idea of “territorial swaps” itself is problematic because it specifically implies two falsehoods. First, it implies that the Palestinians have a right to negotiate from a position that they never held, namely authoritative control over the West Bank, and that their claim to that much land, much less all of that specific land, is superior to Israel’s claim to it. While there may be public sentiment to that effect across much of the world, it is a legal fiction. Control of the land is an obviously essential characteristic of any valid claim to it. Legal control passed from the Ottomans to the British to Jordan to Israel with each in turn applying its control over the laws and population of the territory, demonstrating control.

Moreover, the concept of “territorial swaps” would involve trading one piece of land for another. Would the Palestinians really consider land near Gaza or abutting the southern West Bank as equivalent to neighborhoods around Jerusalem or in the Galilee? Of course not. The presentation of this concept as a simple basis for negotiations is then flawed.

The Right of Return would seem to be the easiest of the problems to overcome. There is no way that Israel can bring in hundreds of thousands, much less several million, Palestinians and maintain the character of Israel as a Jewish state. Neither can Israel bring in hundreds of thousands of people hostile to its existence and not face civil war and strife. Reasonable alternatives to the Right of Return include restitution, but any financial settlement for properties would likely be far less than actual value today and would certainly not be preferable in many cases to ownership of the land. By way of comparison, Holocaust survivors have received millions of dollars in restitution for losses which at the time of the restitution agreement were worth well into the tens, if not hundreds, of billions of dollars.

Those who see the conflict as an Arab-Jewish one, rather than an Israeli-Palestinian one, might well insist that restitution be paid by Arab nations to the Jews whose properties they seized. They argue that the net result would be that Arab nations would be required to pay out more in restitution to the Jews than the Jewish state would to the Arabs.

Finally, there is no resolution to the situation of Jerusalem that will please both sides and there are few solutions that will maintain the security of the city, its economic and civic viability, and access to its archaeological and holy sites for people of all faiths. Jews will be able to securely access the Old City of Jerusalem with its holy sites only if they remain under Israeli sovereignty.

Furthermore, there is no way to maintain security in the area of the holy basin specifically, the area centered on the Temple Mount, unless Israel controls the entire basin from the top of the hill of the Mount of Olives to the west. Neither is it possible for Silwan, to the south of the Temple Mount, to be under Palestinian control for the same reason. To be honest, the entirety of City-of-David-connected Silwan should be a nationally controlled archaeological park and a major tourist site [It is now privately owned by the City of David organization]. The area between the northern access to the Temple mount and Hebrew University on Mount Scopus also must realistically remain under Israeli sovereignty or Hebrew University will be cut off from the rest of Jerusalem.

One could argue, and many do, that the neighborhood of Isawiya, northeast of Mount Scopus, could be put under Palestinian sovereignty along with areas to the southeast of Silwan such as Abu Dis. The area known as E1, between the large Jerusalem suburb of Malei Adumim and Mount Scopus, also abuts Abu Dis and is an obvious connector between the southern and the northern West Bank.

E1 is an area that would make sense to be included in the territory of each side, but to place it on either side of a barrier would create a major problem. If it is on the Palestinian side, Malei Adumim becomes an island, surrounded by Palestinian territory. No Israeli government could allow this. If E1 remains Israeli, someone traveling from Bethlehem to Ramallah through Abu Dis and Anata would have to travel at least ten additional miles to do so, going around Malei Adumim unless a road were constructed that allowed for travelers to cross from south to north through E1. Such a road or tunnel would become essential in such a scenario. Meanwhile, northern Jerusalem’s near suburbs like Ramat Shlomo are certain to remain on the Israeli side in any reasonable peace agreement.

What is holding up the possibility of any agreement in the near future is not willingness on the part of Israel to make concessions, but a willingness on the part of the Palestinian side to admit the reality of what I discussed above. This means that no amount of pressure brought on Israel by European nations or the United States can realistically do anything to advance the peace process. The only affect of such pressure is harm to Israel. In order to advance the peace process, America and European nations need to help the Palestinian side reach an understanding of a reasonable resolution that is viable. Admittedly, once that is accomplished, the make-up of the Israeli governing coalition will become important in moving forward. With a final status agreement possible, the Israeli left would be much more willing to make necessary concessions to work with the Center Right of the political spectrum in order to help it become a reality and the Israeli electorate could well shift support to parties who would more strongly pursue an agreement.

You will note that this solution might be considered a 2 1/2 state solution with Israel and Gaza as completely separate political entities and the West Bank as a semi-separate entity within the security control of Israel. I believe that it is time to think outside of the box and that those who continue to insist on full independence and full border control for the Palestinians in the West Bank are actually doing grave harm and putting off the prospects of peace.

For the most part, Israel has already accepted what it can and must concede for peace. The question is simply, “Will the Palestinian side choose to accept it at the negotiating table if it is offered?” The answer to that depends on which is more painful, accepting a peace they don’t like or continuing to fight a battle that cannot be won and at the cost of suffering and death in every generation.

Posted in We Are For Israel | Tagged , , , , , , , | Leave a comment

The Jubilee Haggadah – A Travesty of Truth

An organization calling itself SISO (Save Israel Stop the Occupation) claims on its website to be “a new initiative of prominent Israeli individuals and organizations who have joined with Jewish leaders from around the world in a sense of urgency about Israel’s future.”

In order to “enlighten” Diaspora Jews as to Israel’s plight it has just published The Jubilee Haggadah, whose on-line sale has been made possible with the cooperation of the New Israel Fund.

What the Haggadah seeks to do is to draw a parallel between Israelite slavery and the lot of the Palestinians. The comparison is, of course, simplistic, false and intended to mislead. Pharaoh and his taskmasters were not interested in reaching an accommodation with the Israelites.

The same cannot be said for most Israelis, who have repeatedly expressed their wish to arrive at a peace agreement with the Palestinians. We remember only too well the 2000 Camp David Summit hosted by President Clinton in which Ehud Barak and Yasser Arafat participated. Clinton has gone on record as blaming Arafat for having refused to respond to Israel’s peace proposals.

Eight years later Ehud Olmert offered the Palestinians an even more generous deal in which Israel would effectively forgo sovereignty of the Temple Mount and in which he proposed a 5%-6% land swap in order to compensate the Palestinians for the major settlement blocs such as Ma’ale Adumim and Ariel that he wished to retain under Israeli jurisdiction. Mahmoud Abbas refused.

I don’t recall Pharaoh offering the Israelites any kind of a deal. On the contrary, he gave a command that every Israelite son be thrown into the Nile (Exodus 1:22).

Nowhere does the Torah tell us that the Israelites wanted to overthrow the Egyptians and take possession of their land. The same cannot be said of the Palestinian Hamas, who control the Gaza Strip and continue to call and work for Israel’s destruction.

Some Palestinians live very comfortably while many lead wretched lives. That was not true of the Israelites in Egypt. All of them suffered. “And they embittered their lives with hard labor” (Exodus 1:14). By contrast, many Palestinians work in Israel bringing home wages far in excess of anything that they could possibly earn at home.

Of course, there are two competing narratives as to how we reached the present tragic situation, which has caused suffering to Palestinians and Israelis alike. Both sides share some responsibility. At least the Haggadah grudgingly acknowledges that when it quotes Prof. Haviva Pedaya as stating that “Nor (is) one party alone guilty for the complex situation.”

However, her statement is more than outbalanced by sketches such as that of a high concrete security barrier reminiscent of the Berlin Wall. No mention is made of the fact that it was erected to protect Israeli citizens following the Second Intifada in which over 1,000 men, women and children were murdered and many more injured and maimed by Palestinian suicide bombers.

This Haggadah is aimed at Diaspora Jews many of whom have little idea of the complexity of Middle East politics and don’t know the history. They will understandably condemn Israel and a further wedge will have been driven between us Israelis and those Jews who bought this Haggadah and were duped by its message. The Palestinians will love it. It has presented only one side of the story without allowing the defense to make its case. That is unpardonable.

 

Posted in Hamas, International Criticism, Peace Negotiations | Leave a comment

UN Security Council Resolution 2334

Many view the decision of the United States not to exercise its veto against UN Security Council Resolution 2334 as the last attempt by President Obama in the death throes of his presidency to score a point against Bibi. White House protestations to the contrary are not taken seriously.

The Resolution is flawed on a number of counts. It demands “that Israel immediately and completely cease all settlement activities in the occupied Palestinian territory, including East Jerusalem”. Presumably that means that Israel has no right to build in the Jewish Quarter of the Old City or in the Jerusalem suburbs of Gilo and French Hill.

While those areas are termed “occupied”, the inability of the Resolution to distinguish between such neighborhoods and isolated settlements and outposts on the West Bank is unhelpful. No Israeli government would ever relinquish those areas and it is foolhardy to even suggest that she should. The sloppy wording of the Resolution only goes to show how far those who voted for it are removed from the facts on the ground.

No less problematic is the unwillingness of those who formulated the Resolution to address Palestinian misdemeanors. It is simply not good enough to condemn “all acts of violence against civilians, including acts of terror, as well as all acts of provocation, incitement and destruction” without specifically naming the Palestinian Authority (PA) and Hamas.

Hamas runs military training “summer camps” for children in the Gaza Strip and has rained down missiles on Israeli civilian targets, while the PA names town squares and football teams after shahidim, who have murdered and maimed thousands of Israeli civilians. When Palestinian terrorists are incarcerated in Israeli prisons, the PA grants their families stipends. Children are taught in PA schools that the day will come when they will return to Haifa and Jaffa. That is not how you build an infrastructure for peace.

However, the Palestinians do not hold a monopoly on fantasies. Settlers who call the West Bank “Judea and Samaria” live under the illusion that we have the right to settle in all of the land that was promised to our ancestor Abraham and in which our forefathers lived over 3,000 years ago. When the Jewish National Fund distributes collection boxes depicting an Israel extending from the river Jordan to the Mediterranean Sea they simply feed that delusion. Building and expanding settlements cannot help Palestinians believe that Israel really supports a territorial compromise.

If the truth be told, neither the Israelis by and large nor the Palestinians are prepared to forgo their expansionist fantasies and recognize that both sides will have to put their dreams aside if they are to live in peace.

A joint Israeli Palestinian poll recently showed that nearly 60 percent of both Israeli Jews and Palestinians were against a permanent status agreement based on previous Israeli-Palestinian peace talks.

If the truth be told, both sides are headed by leaders unable and unwilling to pay the price that a comprehensive settlement would require. Prime Minister Netanyahu panders to the settlers and stands at the head of a Likkud whose coalition is more right-wing than any government that Israel has ever known.

Meanwhile, President Abbas is ever fearful that Hammas will displace the PA on the West Bank. Like Netanyahu, he cannot afford to be perceived of as favoring compromise. The rise of Islamism and Al-Qaeda has only served to increase anxiety about the threats that surround us and have created an atmosphere in which Israel is unlikely to take risks.

And that is the political context in which the United Nations Security Council has seen fit to castigate Israeli policy with regard to settlements. The PA is delighted with the outcome of a vote from which the United States chose to abstain. Israel’s enemies are rubbing their hands with glee that she has been given a bloody nose. However, the Resolution is ultimately futile and won’t contribute one iota to solving the Israel/Palestinian conflict. On the contrary, it will make some Israelis wonder what Obama really meant when he said “I’ve got your back”.

Posted in International Criticism, Peace Negotiations, Pressuring Israel | 2 Comments

Implications of Failed Manipulations

It seems that Tony Blair and John Kerry worked to try to get Prime Minister Netanyahu to add the Zionist Union into the coalition in order to promote peace efforts. Let’s consider this for a moment.

  1. This would mean foreign governments were actively trying to manipulate the composition of the elected government of Israel to suit their desires. This makes Bibi’s speech to Congress in an attempt to publicly share his opinion on the Iran nuclear deal pale, by far, in comparison, laughably so. This would be like Israel trying to get Hillary Clinton to make Bernie Sanders her VP and to change her policies to be in line with his. Actually, it’s more like Israel trying to encourage Donald Trump to make Hillary Clinton, the leader of the opposing side, his VP, but that doesn’t work in our political system, so Clinton-Sanders is a better example.
  2. Kerry and Blair failed so miserably that not only did Zionist Union not end up joining the coalition, they created an environment that encouraged Israel Beiteinu to join it! This actually makes the governing coalition even a further right leaning one.
  3. Zionist Union was again harmed by those foreign powers trying to use it. Think about this for a moment. Zionist Union was literally being used by foreign powers to influence Israeli governmental policy. Let that one sink in.
  4. Avigdor Lieberman may be problematic for a number of reasons, but his ability to work with Russian leaders at a time when Israel needs to work with Russia on Syria and Iran related security issues actually makes his appointment to Minister of Defense make some sense.
  5. Herzog overplayed his hand. Instead of settling for joining the coalition and promoting policies tilted in its direction, Herzog insisted on commitments that would have forced Netanyahu’s other coalition partners to leave the coalition and quite possibly split his own party.
  6. There was no chance that he would willingly do that. Somehow, Herzog seems to have been convinced that pressure against Netanyahu might be enough to make him do it. That is the only possible reasonable interpretation and it means that Herzog expected Israel to be threatened if Netanyahu didn’t comply.
  7. So one question before us is “Will the Quartet threaten Israel, now that Netanyahu has not complied?”
  8. Another is “What actual policy changes may occur with Israel Beiteinu in the coalition, if any?”

****Update May 20, 2016

Bogie Ya’alon has now left the government. This is significant further damage of the failed attempt to bring the Zionist Union into the government. Ya’alon was a moderate voice in the Likud led cabinet. Replacing him on the Likud MK list is Yehuda Glick of Temple Mount fame.

So instead of having a Netanyahu led coalition barely scraping by with 61 seats and having Ya’alon’s moderate voice and military leadership experience in the cabinet as Defense Minister, Israel now has Avigdor Liberman in the cabinet, Yehuda Glick in the K’nesset, a severely weakened opposition leader in Herzog and a strengthened right leaning coalition that now tilts further right.

Posted in We Are For Israel | 10 Comments

Hope and Security – Toward Two States

Going on mostly behind the scenes are many cooperative efforts between Israel, Egypt, Jordan and the Saudis. The Sunni Nationalist states would greatly benefit from Israeli-Palestinian peace for no reason other than that they need to work with Israel right now with or without that peace. It would be far less politically problematic for them to do so with a peace agreement of some sort. So Egypt’s Al Sisi is encouraging one and Netanyahu says that Israel is ready for it.

Al Sisi said that:

If we are able to — all of us together — with effort and a real will and devotion, find a solution for this issue, and find hope for the Palestinians and security for the Israelis, I am telling you a new page will be written.

Note how Al Sisi frames the issue:

  1. Hope for the Palestinians.
  2. Security for the Israelis.

In other words, peace is going to continue to be a process. Hope means moving forward toward a better future. Security means not jeopardizing something you already have. That is precisely what is needed. The Palestinian people need to be able to look forward to a future better than the present. The Israelis need to know that they will be able to live securely in Israel as it now defines itself, Jewish and Democratic.

Interestingly, this all brings Fatah’s Arab allies full circle. Once they were engaged on the side of the Palestinians to bring about peace with Israel and then disengaged because of the Fatah-Hamas civil war. Now they are engaged as a way to help themselves.

This is perhaps the first time that Israeli-Palestinian negotiations are possible in which none of the major players (Israel, the Palestinian Authority, Egypt, Jordan and Saudi Arabia) see any of the others as a proxy of any other nation. In fact, it is readily apparent that with the exception of Hamas controlled Gaza, this group recognizes that they will have to work together to combat regional threats arrayed against all of them, namely Iran and the Islamic State. Furthermore, among the group, Israel is the most essential partner to have, providing incentive for each to maintain a working, if not good, strategic relationship.

The leaders already understand this and are engaged with each other. The general population of the Sunni Arab nations, however, is more reluctant to approve of the needed relationships until peace of some sort is achieved. Yes, some would object to any peace with Israel, but no few would not and the absence of overwhelming opposition to cooperation with Israel would be advantageous in combating the regional threats.

Within Israel, this news brings additional incentive for the Zionist Union to enter the coalition. As a member of the government, it could urge the government to move forward in some fashion and allow it to do so without threat of collapse at the hands of the right wing parties.

Don’t get all excited yet. We’re not going to see Bibi and Abu Mazen walking down the paths of Camp David anytime soon, but we may see some progress in the right direction for the first time in a long time. That at least might be something to give us all hope for the future.

Posted in Egypt, Peace Negotiations, We Are For Israel | Tagged , , , , , , | 1 Comment

The Sad State of the Two State Debate

These are the words of the leader of the pro-peace Labor party, Buji Herzog:

I don’t see a possibility at the moment of implementing the two-state solution. I want to yearn for it, I want to move toward it, I want negotiations, I sign on to it and I am obligated to it, but I don’t see the possibility of doing it right now.

It is not simply that Prime Minister Netanyahu is not willing to bring it about. Instead, it is that security concerns must be addressed first. According to the Times of Israel:

Netanyahu and [PA President Mahmoud Abbas] are incapable of moving forward,” he alleged — but [Herzog] said that should he be elected prime minister, his coalition would focus on implementing security measures rather than a bilateral agreement.

The dominant perspectives in Israel right now in regard to the possibility of a two-state solution are the following:

The position of the Center-Left (30-40% including much of the Zionist Union and Yesh Atid): A two-state solution might be possible at some future date provided security measures are addressed first, accomplished, and proven effective. Only then, when those who seek to harm Israelis and would be significantly empowered by the increased freedom of mobility and ability to acquire supplies that would be available in a two state solution, can Israel realistically move forward. Some on the left in the past have suggested that the Palestinian Authority must regain effective control of Gaza as part of this process. The settlement blocs and metro Jerusalem would remain under Israeli control. The Center-Left would encourage the Prime Minister to maintain policies that would promote the possibility of a two-state solution to happen in the long-term.

The position of the Center-Right (30-40% including much of Likud and Kulanu): A full two-state solution with Palestinian border control is unrealistic for the foreseeable future. In essence, the Center-Right would begin with the conditions set by the Center-Left and add relatively long-term Israeli border control and stronger security measures. The difference in the short term is that the Center-Right is more reluctant to accept restrictions on policy necessary to promote a long-term peace agreement.

The position of the Right extreme (10-20% including much of Jewish Home, UTJ, SHAS, and some of Likud): All of the land belongs to the Jews. Most of those from this perspective believe that the status-quo can be maintained indefinitely with Palestinians living within Israel’s borders as citizens of an observer state within the state. A tiny minority believe that the Muslim Arabs [they see the Palestinians not as a national group at all] should leave the Jewish state and go elsewhere if they are not willing to accept the status-quo.

The position of the Left extreme (10-20% including much of Meretz and the Arab List): There must be either a two-state solution put in place in the near future or else Israel must act as if the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza are Israeli citizens. Either of these solutions would accept that major security problems would accompany the solutions.

Looking at this, one must accept that while a substantial majority of Israelis believe that a two state solution that provides Israel security would be the goal, upwards of 70% of the Israeli population believes that not only is a two-state solution not possible in the foreseeable future, but that there is much work to do on the security situation, both in the shorter and longer terms, in order to alter that reality.

Posted in Peace Negotiations | Tagged , , , , , , , , , | 1 Comment

The Attempt to Start an Intifada

There is some debate whether or not we are witnessing a new intifada, a new uprising. The reality is that we are definitely witnessing an attempt by Hamas to produce one. Today, Ismail Haniyeh, Hamas’ leader in Gaza, stated:

We are calling for the strengthening and increasing of the intifada… It is the only path that will lead to liberation.

Past efforts have begun with arming militants on the Temple Mount with rocks, incendiaries, and explosives. During the past few weeks of clashes, Israeli security forces have discovered attempts to arm protesters on the Temple Mount and have even discovered pipe bombs prepared for use there.

Additionally, the rhetoric associated with the last intifada, namely that Israel is trying to take over the Temple Mount, is being used by Palestinian leaders as a way to stir up protests. There is no effort by Israel to change the status-quo of the site, but the Palestinian leadership has been insisting that there is, something that has been done in the past to promote protests against Israel and remains an effective way to do so around the region.

Hamas, severely weakened by the sealing of the Egypt-Gaza border by a hostile Egyptian government, desperately needs Palestinians in the West Bank to engage in an intifada in order to change the dynamic on the ground. There has been little ongoing violent action against Israel and diplomatic channels have failed to produce the necessary pressure on Israel to bring them about.

Furthermore, with Egypt, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia all essentially working with Israel on the three major issues facing the region (The Syrian Civil War, The Islamic State, and Iran), the Palestinian cause has been largely ignored by those whom the Palestinians desperately need to fight for them in order to make any headway against Israel, much less to ultimately destroy the Jewish state.

Palestinian Pres. Abbas’ recent warnings about the possibility of an intifada have also been attempts to promote one by giving voice and support to those who have been seeking to once again resort to violence. This has put the ball squarely into Hamas’ ready and waiting hands along with those of the Al Aqsa Martyrs Brigades, the militant branch of Abbas’ own Fatah party, and Islamic Jihad.

But this is a dangerous game. Pres. Abbas wants to draw the world’s attention to his cause and to demonstrate his ability to stop violence while maintaining control over the West Bank. It is important for Abbas to be able to show that there is a realistic threat of violence in the West Bank for which security cooperation between Israel and the Palestinian Authority at an extensive level is required and that therefore Israeli concessions to the Palestinians are also necessary.

Thus, violence and protests are essential to Abbas’ cause, but not a full scale intifada which would be difficult to control and dangerous for Abbas and his associates specifically.

The problems that those who want to get a new intifada going face numerous issues:

Gaza based Hamas, which is definitely the most dangerous to Israel of the three organizations at the moment, is not in a good position to help. The Egyptian border is much more tightly controlled now than at any point in time since 1967.

The most likely goal of any current Hamas led attempt at an intifada right now would be the unseating of the Fatah led government in the West Bank rather than accomplishing anything significant against Israel in the long term or to alter Egypt’s defensive posture against Gaza. Pres. Abbas needs to be very careful about how much he allows this violence to strengthen.

Hamas is not Pres. Abbas’ only problem. The Al Aqsa Martyrs Brigades, a wing of Fatah, which has been largely silent for a number of years may either be ready to have Pres. Abbas and Fatah abandon the solely diplomatic tack of Palestinian efforts in recent years or they too may be emboldened to engage in violence in an attempt to take control of Fatah and with it leadership over the West Bank.

Meanwhile, Islamic Jihad will no doubt have been strengthened because of the nuclear and financial agreement with its patron state of Iran. Islamic Jihad could be seeking to aid Hamas or the Al Aqsa Martyrs in efforts to harm Israel. But without a doubt, Iran would prefer to see Hamas, with whom it has worked in the past, take over the leadership of the Palestinian cause.

Thus far, President Abbas’ response to the recent attacks has been to blame Israel and to appear somewhat supportive of both the terrorists and protests. However, should the attacks and protests rage out of control, not only is there a likelihood of Israeli incursions into the West Bank, but of the very destabilization that these militant groups seek in hoping to remove Abbas from power.

This week, Abbas began to realize the danger that he faces from within and has issued calls to his forces to urgently quell protests. While the public explanation is to “deny Israel a pretext for a West Bank crackdown,” the reality is that the greater danger is to his own rule in the West Bank with or without any Israeli incursions. It does not take a genius to realize that the reason for protests is a failure of the current Palestinian leadership in their efforts to overcome Israel and to reclaim, in the least, rule over Jerusalem as well as to end the occupation of the West Bank. Should protests grow, it would be all too easy for them to rapidly turn against the failed leadership of Fatah.

In the meantime, the Palestinian leadership, both Hamas and Fatah, are encouraging violence against Israeli civilians, something which should be condemned in the strongest terms and because of which US and European cooperation and support for the Palestinian leadership should be brought into question.

Posted in We Are For Israel | Tagged , , , , , | Leave a comment

Implications of the Iran Deal and US Policy in the ME

With most of the attention focused on specifics contained in the Joint Comprehensive Plan Of Action JCPOA with Iran, aka the Iran Deal, concerning its nuclear program, it appears that the background of changes evidenced in the relationship between the West and Iran, and especially between the US and Iran, are being missed.

In the negotiations with Iran, the Obama Administration seems to have had three goals, not one:

  1. Prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon while enforcing the ideals of peaceful nuclear energy that are part of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.
  2. Adapt to the desire of, and increasing pressure from, Europe, Russia, and China to end the sanctions regime against Iran as soon as possible and to try to put the end of those sanctions in their best light as well as to obtain any concessions from Iran that might be possible.
  3. End the isolation–diplomatic, cultural, as well as economic–of Iran from the West and to bring Iran into the family of nations in the hope that doing so would ultimately lead to moderation of Iran’s behavior. This was a part of a larger philosophical change in how America would conduct relations with Muslim nations.

Viewing the negotiations with Iran as if part of the first of these goals, to prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon, has been the only operative goal necessarily leads to a misunderstanding of the situation.

There has been a fundamental shift in American strategic policy toward the Muslim world that has been underway since President Obama took office in 2009, and many of us have expressed strong concerns since it began.

In April of 2009, President Obama delivered a speech in Ankara to the Turkish Parliament. Turkey was the exemplar of what President Obama sought to see throughout Middle East, a democratic Muslim nation. That the Erdogan government has not always, in fact often not, supported Democratic principles through its actions is besides the point. The President’s speech, at the time, seemed to be primarily focused on strengthening America’s relationship with Turkey, which had been frayed during the Bush Administration, but in retrospect it was the initial introduction to the new US regional strategic policy of outreach to the Muslim world.

Then in June of 2009, President Obama spoke in Cairo at Al Azhar University and, building upon his Ankara speech, reinforced the idea that the United States was seeking to change its relationship with Muslims around the world. The initial assumption was that this change included a shift between supporting dictatorial regimes to more democratic ones in Sunni nations, such as Turkey, and put Hosni Mubarak on notice that Egypt needed to change. The immediate impact of this shift was the emboldening and, in many ways, empowering of the Muslim Brotherhood, especially in Egypt, and along with other Islamist groups as they challenged Sunni dictators.

Within a short time after these speeches, we had Political Islamist revolutions in Egypt, Tunisia, Libya and Syria with mixed results in each nation, though a large amount of bloodshed in them all. I use the term, “Political Islamist,” to refer to those groups who seek to install Sharia law as the primary law of their nations, superseding secular law, and in most cases also seek the reconfiguration of an Islamic Caliphate ruling all similar nations.

In addition to the revolutions that occurred, often called the “Arab Spring,” the US withdrew its forces from Iraq, leaving a weak Shia controlled government to deal with a growing Sunni extremist opposition that had been suppressed at one time by a dictatorial regime led by Saddam Hussein and then by a strong US presence.

The focus of most western attention in the relationship between the US and Muslims was on the Arab world. Behind the scenes were more changes.

The desire was to change the relationship with Muslims, not just Arab Sunni Muslims. The Shia were always part of the plan.

Now, I would be remiss if I didn’t mention that outreach to the Shia didn’t begin in 2009. It began in 2003, during the Bush Administration, when a Shia controlled Iraqi government was installed. At a time shortly after Sunni extremists affiliated with Al Qaeda had just killed thousands of Americans, September 11, 2001, the US made a strategic decision not to oppose Shia anti-Sunni activism in Shia dominated nations, especially against anti-American Sunni forces.

It was a priority of the Bush Administration to ensure stability of the Shia government in Iraq, while attempting to limit Iranian influence. President Bush hoped that the Shia government of Iraq would be a pro-American and not a pro-Iranian government that could influence changes in the US-Iran relationship by building a US-Shia Muslim relationship separate from a US-Iran one.

Things changed when President Obama took office. Here is what President Obama promised concerning Iraq in June of 2009 in his Al Azhar University speech in Cairo:

Today, America has a dual responsibility:  to help Iraq forge a better future — and to leave Iraq to Iraqis.  And I have made it clear to the Iraqi people — (applause) — I have made it clear to the Iraqi people that we pursue no bases, and no claim on their territory or resources.  Iraq’s sovereignty is its own. And that’s why I ordered the removal of our combat brigades by next August.  That is why we will honor our agreement with Iraq’s democratically elected government to remove combat troops from Iraqi cities by July, and to remove all of our troops from Iraq by 2012.  (Applause.)  We will help Iraq train its security forces and develop its economy.  But we will support a secure and united Iraq as a partner, and never as a patron.

By withdrawing our troops and leaving a significant power vacuum in Iraq, we both abandoned the idea of fully developing a US-Shia Muslim relationship apart from a US-Iran one and allowed the rise of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria, a.k.a. ISIS.

The President brought into the White House, an entirely new philosophy in regard to foreign policy. This was perhaps best expressed in the President’s September 2009 speech to the United Nations:

It is my deeply held belief that in the year 2009 — more than at any point in human history — the interests of nations and peoples are shared…Those who used to chastise America for acting alone in the world cannot now stand by and wait for America to solve the world’s problems alone.  We have sought — in word and deed — a new era of engagement with the world.  And now is the time for all of us to take our share of responsibility for a global response to global challenges.

America would take a step or more back and try to engage with countries from which we had distanced ourselves. Connected to this was a primary policy change in relation to Muslims expressed in President Obama’s 2009 Cairo speech:

America will defend itself, respectful of the sovereignty of nations and the rule of law.  And we will do so in partnership with Muslim communities which are also threatened.  The sooner the extremists are isolated and unwelcome in Muslim communities, the sooner we will all be safer.

Because the priority of our overall strategic policy was not to support a secure region controlled by pro-American regimes, though we hoped for one and still do, but to absent America from what could appear as meddling or significant influence through military power, we abandoned the peacekeeping role in Iraq and refused to truly take sides in any of the conflicts in the Muslim world even when they were between US allies and US enemies.

The priority of the Obama Administration was to change how America acted in relation to Muslim countries, to work with Muslim regimes as partners, not as a patron. Our new policy was to respect the sovereignty of Muslim majority nations, which in practice meant, to leave them to deal with their problems instead of dealing with them ourselves in our ways.

This virtually ensured that Sunni insurgents would rise to challenge the Shia Iraqi government and that Iran would replace the United States as that government’s primary supporter, creating the situation that President Bush’s foreign policy hoped to avoid, namely an Iranian controlled Iraq.

This also meant tens of thousands of innocent casualties including genocide of the Yazidis, whom the Shia did not choose to defend, or were unable to defend, US allied Kurdish forces facing fierce battles in Iraq, and hundreds of thousands of casualties in Syria, where we chose not to aid our friends or harm our foes. It did not matter whether America’s use of military power would be against Sunni extremists or Shia ones. We were content to back away.

That is except when those extremists were or are a threat to us. Hence, we did use and continue to use military force to target Sunni anti-American extremists.

At first, we only conducted operations against Al Qaeda, including launching an operation to capture or kill Osama Bin Laden in Pakistan. We launched strikes against Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula in Yemen and against other leaders in Afghanistan. But we left-alone extremists, both Sunni and Shia, who were targeting those in their own countries or in the region for nations in the region to handle on their own.

Hence, we made no effort to aid anyone in the Syrian civil war. We threatened to act, but did not act, against Assad’s regime. We utterly failed to respond to the rise of the Islamic State, Da”esh, until it’s supporters began acting in Europe and America. We did nothing to involve ourselves in the Yemeni civil war, where Iranian backed Houthi Shia have taken over the country from American allied Sunnis, nor did we involve ourselves in either the initial Muslim Brotherhood takeover of Egypt or the later overthrow of that regime by the pro-American Al Sisi, though for a while we did seem to disapprove of the latter as anti-democratic.

In regard to Iran, our policy appears to attempt to prevent Iran from threatening America through the acquisition of nuclear weapons, but not necessarily to try to prevent it from threatening its neighbors through the use and support of terrorism, insurgency, and proxy movements.

Our policy in regard to Iran changed. President Obama said in his speech to the Turkish Parliament on April 6, 2009, less than three months into his first term in office:

I have made it clear to the people and leaders of the Islamic Republic of Iran that the United States seeks engagement based on mutual interest and mutual respect. We want Iran to play its rightful role in the community of nations. Iran is a great civilization. We want them to engage in the economic and political integration that brings prosperity and security. But Iran’s leaders must choose whether they will try to build a weapon or build a better future for their people.

Add to this, what the President said in his 2009 UN speech about Iran’s nuclear program specifically:

I am committed to diplomacy that opens a path to greater prosperity and more secure peace for both nations if they live up to their obligations.
But if the governments of Iran and North Korea choose to ignore international standards; if they put the pursuit of nuclear weapons ahead of regional stability and the security and opportunity of their own people; if they are oblivious to the dangers of escalating nuclear arms races in both East Asia and the Middle East — then they must be held accountable.  The world must stand together to demonstrate that international law is not an empty promise, and that treaties will be enforced.  We must insist that the future does not belong to fear.

These words are almost verbatim the President’s commentary on the 2015 Iran Deal and, more specifically, the echo his views about what he accomplished with the deal. The question is whether or not these sentiments are an accurate assessment of the decisions that Iran’s leaders have made or of wishful thinking based upon what the President hopes that his new American approach toward Muslim nations and specifically toward Iran will produce.

No matter which is true, this policy requires the end to sanctions or at least a dramatic weakening of them. In fact, with this policy, the Obama Administration would not see maintaining sanctions against Iran as beneficial to America, even were there no concessions regarding Iran’s nuclear program.

In other words, sanctions relief against Iran is not seen as a concession to Iran, but as a part of a new approach toward Iran.

Coupled with pressure to end sanctions from Europe, Russia, and China, this explains why the Obama Administration appears eager to end nuclear related sanctions, though it suggests that doing so does require action by Iran in regard to its nuclear program. A similar approach, the ending of sanctions, was put into place in regard to Cuba as well, but in that case without any proposed action by Cuba. The Administration believes that the ending of sanctions will positively impact Iran’s behavior.

In this circumstance, the nuclear agreement is both an attempt to halt Iran’s path to a nuclear weapon and, functionally, cover for a desired broader policy change. Rather than the ending of sanctions being a concession made in exchange for Iranian nuclear concessions, the ending of sanctions and an indefinite delay in the Iranian nuclear weapons program were two distinctly separate goals.

Think about this quote from the 2009 Ankhara speech in relation to the 2015 Iran JCPOA:

The United States is not, and will never be, at war with Islam.  In fact, our partnership with the Muslim world is critical not just in rolling back the violent ideologies that people of all faiths reject, but also to strengthen opportunity for all its people.

Above all, above all we will demonstrate through actions our commitment to a better future… We want to expand the trade and investment that can bring prosperity for all people. In the months ahead, I will present specific programs to advance these goals. Our focus will be on what we can do, in partnership with people across the Muslim world, to advance our common hopes and our common dreams. And when people look back on this time, let it be said of America that we extended the hand of friendship to all people.
There’s an old Turkish proverb: “You cannot put out fire with flames.” America knows this. Turkey knows this. There’s some who must be met by force, they will not compromise. But force alone cannot solve our problems, and it is no alternative to extremism. The future must belong to those who create, not those who destroy. That is the future we must work for, and we must work for it together.

You need not look far beyond these statements to understand why the negotiating position of the United States in regard to the Iranian nuclear program and therefore the resulting JCPOA is seen as so problematic by many people. The negotiating position itself is a radical departure from the traditional strategic posture of the United States, one based on the level of threat that Iran’s government poses to the US and its allies. This position is instead based on an understanding that America’s past actions in regard to Iran caused much, if not most, of the West’s current problems with Iran and that it behooves the US and the West to attempt to improve Iran’s financial situation irregardless of its behavior in an attempt to influence average Iranians to advance pro-American policy changes. We are seeking engagement and even a partnership with Iran which the President believes will affect the changes that we seek in Iran.

Furthermore, seeing Iran currently as an ally against those Sunni extremists and terrorists who threaten the United States and its allies, ISIS and Al Qaeda, the US seeks to empower Iran to act more vigorously against them in Iraq and Syria.

The Obama Administration realizes that this will also strengthen Iran’s ability to act against Israel and other American allies in the region and has pledged to stand by America’s allies, but hopes that the new approach to Iran and interaction with Iran will moderate it in the long term, if not the short term.

The idea that the Iranian people will swiftly overthrow their current regime and take their place as a Shia version of Turkey, perceived as a friend of the West, is highly questionable. The substantial financial influx not only will aid Iran in supporting its proxies, especially Hizballah and the Assad regime, but it could strengthen the regime itself, especially in the short term, as its controlled companies will gain influence within the country and increase dependence on the regime. Perhaps, things will change for the better when Khameneii dies, but the opposite could come to pass as well.

Whether or not this new strategic approach to the Middle East works, it is a high risk proposition, especially for America’s allies in the region. Even if the JCPOA will work exactly as the Administration hopes and prevent any advancement of Iran toward the acquisition of a nuclear weapon, the strategic policy shift that I have described will negatively impact the security of our allies in the region in the short term, both through the withdrawal of the threat of significant American military action over conventional military action by Iran, directly or through proxies, and through the resulting necessity of each enemy of Iran having to make up the difference through the acquisition of their own arms. The foreign policy changes since 2009 along with the 2015 JCPOA with Iran and its aftermath will make Israel’s neighborhood a far more dangerous place to live in the short term and present it, along with America’s Sunni allies, with existential challenges.

In the aftermath of this agreement, but moreso through the changes in America’s regional policies, not only will Israel face a stronger Iran and stronger Iranian proxies, it will be surrounded by militarily stronger Arab nations, because they have no choice but to make themselves stronger in the face of the Iranian challenge.

It is absolutely vital to understand that Israel’s relationship with America will become even more essential to its prosperity and security than it is now. No matter where we find ourselves in support or opposition of the Iran Deal, whether we oppose it altogether, want to tweak it, or see it as reasonable or better, no matter whose “experts” we trust, it is for certain the case that those of us who care about Israel must strive to strengthen the US-Israel relationship going forward.

In the meantime, it is important to express concerns about US policy changes in the Middle East and the the Iran Deal specifically, both in regards to potential faults in its provisions and to the absence of provisions addressing Iranian behavior going forward. The consequences of these in combination will be have a profound impact upon the region, especially upon Israel, and upon America.

Posted in Iran, We Are For Israel | Tagged , , , , , , | Leave a comment

Holocaust Imagery and the Iran Deal

I have been thinking of how many friends of mine, including Holocaust survivors, may their memories be for a blessing, would react to the debate concerning the agreement with Iran. I cannot but feel that they would be distressed by what they would be hearing. Much of the debate is simply vile.

Friends, while the Iran Deal poses serious concerns for some of us, it is an attempt to keep the worst weapon out of the hands of the most dangerous nation. The use of Holocaust imagery and references to describe supporters of that agreement are inappropriate its reality and to the their advocacy, much less offensive to the memory of the Holocaust, and do not promote the needed atmosphere of debate.

Good people who care about Israel and Jews can debate the effectiveness of the agreement and can discuss its merits and its failings. While some may be in great fear over the impact of this agreement on Israel and the region, certainly they must also fear what might happen should Iran acquire a nuclear weapon!

Let us not demonize each other. Supporters of this deal are not [insert inappropriate Holocaust imagery here] and opponents who are showing concern about some of its provisions are not “warmongers.”

The Holocaust was the greatest evil the world has yet seen. My friends, it is not 1939. It is 2015. Thankfully, there is a strong and vibrant Jewish state with a great ability to defend itself, something not remotely the case 76 years prior. The well-being of that Jewish state depends significantly on bipartisan support in America and the well-being of that Jewish state has been cited as and is a primary concern of many of those on both sides of the issue at hand in America.

Let us not do an injustice to the memory of the Holocaust–to those who died, to those who survived, to the heroes and martyrs–by evoking those images in this debate among those on both sides who very much wish to avoid another Holocaust.

So, Presidential candidates, if you’re reading this,

It is highly inappropriate, heinous and offensive, to call supporters of the agreement something that seeks to connect them with the Nazis, or portrays opponents of the agreement in the traditional antisemitic depiction of Jews as the promoters of warfare, calling them warmongers!

Posted in Iran | Tagged , , , , , , | Leave a comment